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A tractable analysis of contagious equilibria†
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Abstract
This paper studies contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated matching games.
The innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punishment that, used
together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-form expressions
for continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This allows a transparent characterization
of the dynamic incentives created by contagious punishment schemes.
Keywords: Cooperation, social norms, grim trigger, random matching.
JEL codes: C6, C7
1 Introduction
The studies in [4, 6] have extended the analysis of cooperation in infinitely
repeated games from economies with stable partnerships to random matching
economies, where relational contracting is unavailable. The central result is
that full cooperation can be achieved even if players cannot exploit reciprocity
† We thank an anonymous referee for several helpful comments. G. Camera acknowl-
edges partial research support through the NSF grant CCF-1101627. Correspondence ad-
dress: Gabriele Camera, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University
Dr., Orange, CA 92866, USA; e-mail: camera@chapman.edu. Alessandro Gioffre´: Fac-
ulty of Business and Economics, Department of Macroeconomics, University of Basel, Peter
Merian-Weg 6, CH - 4002 Basel, Switzerland; e-mail: alessandro.gioffre@unibas.ch.
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mechanisms because agents are anonymous, and can neither communicate with
nor can observe others’ past behaviors. In these matching economies, coop-
eration relies on adopting a common strategy (=a social norm) that includes
the threat of unforgiving punishment. According to this norm, a player al-
ways cooperates unless someone defects, in which case the player switches to
punishing by defecting forever.
Studying equilibrium in these economies is analytically cumbersome be-
cause, once punishment starts, it spreads at random, through cooperator-
defector encounters. This contagious punishment process complicates the
characterization of continuation payoffs, which holds the key to establishing
whether dynamic incentives exist for players to follow the social norm.
This study contributes to the literature on cooperation and contagious
punishments by showing how to attain a tractable closed-form expression of
continuation payoffs, off equilibrium. This is done by, first, identifying and
characterizing a key statistic of contagious punishment processes, which we
call the contact rate. This is the rate at which a defector expects to meet
cooperators in the continuation game. We then use such a statistic to derive
through a recursive formulation tractable closed-form expressions for contin-
uation payoffs off equilibrium, which are simply convex combinations of static
payoffs; the convexification factor depends on the number of defectors present
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in the economy, the discount factor, and the breadth of monitoring.
To see the difference with previous work, note that [4] bases the existence
proof on a pointwise analysis of continuation payoffs, i.e., for a specific real-
ization of a matching trajectory. Instead, we follow the approach in [6], which
is matrix-theoretic; we augment it by adopting a recursive formulation that
allows us to obtain tractable closed-form expressions for continuation payoffs,
away from the equilibrium path of play. This has the virtue of making the
analysis of contagious equilibrium transparent. In particular, we generalize
the expressions for continuation payoffs for all possible beliefs about the num-
ber of defectors, whereas the literature typically considers only the case of
two defectors. In this manner we can characterize exact bounds on the two
parameters that are key to ensuring that cooperation is self-enforcing: the
discount factor and the cost sustained to slow down the contagious spread
of defections. This is theoretically meaningful it helps us to better under-
stand how changes in the game’s parameters affect the incentives to follow
contagious punishments and it is also empirically meaningful it helps us to
construct laboratory economies based on repeated, random matching games
(e.g., see [1, 2]).
We proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3
identifies some basic properties of the typical contagious punishment process,
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which are then used in Section 4, to recursively derive payoffs as a convex
combination of static payoffs. Section 5 shows how this machinery can be used
to characterize bounds on parameters that support cooperative equilibrium
in repeated matching games with private monitoring. Section 6 extends the
analysis to games with (imperfect) public monitoring and public randomization
devices. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider an economy in which anonymous agents are randomly and bilaterally
matched in each period to play a stage game. There are N = 2n ≥ 4 infinitely-
lived agents, who have linear preferences and discount the future with common
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Equivalently, let the economy be of indefinite
duration where β is the time-invariant probability that, after each period the
economy continues for one additional period, and otherwise the economy ends.
In each period t = 0, 1, . . ., an exogenous matching process partitions the
population into n pairs. Pairings are random, equally likely, independent over
time, and last only one period. Let oi(t) 6= i be agent i’s opponent in period t,
where oi is an involution. Agents cannot observe the identities of others and
cannot recognize individuals if they meet them again (= anonymity).
In every period t each agent in {i, oi(t)}, for i = 1, . . . , N , faces an identi-
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cal two-player stage game that consists of simultaneously and independently
selecting one action from the set {C,D}. The possible stage-game payoffs
to agent i are piDD, piCD, piDC , and piCC , where the first subscript refers to i’s
action in the four possible outcomes (D,D), (C,D), (D,C), and (C,C). We
assume that (C,C) is the socially efficient outcome and that piDC > piCC and
piDD > piCD, i.e., the game is a social dilemma where there are incentives to
behave opportunistically. Each agent i observes the actions (but not the iden-
tities) of a set of agents denoted Oi(t, a), which includes agent i, i’s opponent
oi(t), and a = 0, . . . , N − 2 other randomly selected agents. The case a = 0
corresponds to private monitoring, which is when Oi(t, 0) = Oi(t) = {i, oi(t)}.
At the other extreme, a = N−2, we have public monitoring. In-between cases
capture situations that we dub, with a small abuse in language, “imperfect”
public monitoring in which, for instance, players see the actions of those who
are spatially close to them but not of everyone in the economy.1
Suppose every agent i = 1, . . . , N adopts the following trigger strategy
(e.g., see [4]):
Definition 1. On t = 0, agent i is in state s = C and selects action C. On
all t > 0, agent i is either in state s = C or s = D, and selects action s.
• If agent i is in state C in period t, then i switches state on t+ 1 only if
1For example, the matching process randomly partitions the population into pairwise
disjoint groups of size a+ 2 in each period. In each group agents play in pairs but observe
all the actions taken in their group.
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some agent in Oi(t, a) selected D. Otherwise, i remains in state C.
• State D is absorbing.
In what follows, we focus on the case when everyone in the population follows
the strategy in Definition 1, i.e., we consider a social norm as in [4, 6]. This
norm has two components: a rule of desirable behavior (always choose C)
and a rule of punishment (always choose D) selected only if a departure from
desirable behavior is observed. For this reason, we will call an agent who is in
state C a “cooperator,” and a “defector” otherwise.
The central feature of grim play is that any defection starts an irreversible
contagious punishment process that eventually leads to an environment in
which everyone is a defector. Depending on the parameter a, punishment
may spread in the economy either by means of direct contact with a defec-
tor or indirectly, by observing a defection outside of the agent’s match. Such
unforgiving decentralized punishment scheme forms the basis of cooperation
because it removes the incentive to behave opportunistically when agents are
sufficiently patient. In the next section we discuss the properties of decentral-
ized punishment, and in the section that follows we show that such properties
hold the key to a tractable formulation of out-of-equilibrium payoffs.
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3 Properties of decentralized punishment
Consider the start of a generic period. Suppose the population is partitioned
into k = 1, . . . , N defectors and N − k cooperators. Let
σk := N−kN−1 with σk ∈ σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σN−1, 0)T
define the probability that on this date defector i meets a cooperator.2 It
should be clear that 0 = σN < σk′ < σk < σ1 = 1 for 2 ≤ k < k′ ≤ N − 1. Let
k ∈ κ := (1, . . . , N)T
denote the state of the economy on a generic date and define theN−dimensional
column vector ek with 1 in the kth position and 0 everywhere else.
Theorem 1. Suppose there are k = 1, . . . , N defectors and that each agent i
observes the actions of agents in Oi(t, a) for a = 0, . . . , N − 2. The probability
distribution of defectors evolves over the span of t ≥ 1 periods according to
eTkQ
t where Q is an N × N transition matrix with elements Qkk′ and mean
µk(t) := eTkQtκ satisfying:
1. Qkk′ = 0 for k′ < k;
2. Qkk < 1 = QNN for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1;
3. µk+1(t) ≥ µk(t), for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1 and all t ≥ 1;
4. µk(t+ 1) ≥ µk(t) ≥ k, for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1 and all t ≥ 1;
5. µk(t) is non-decreasing in a.
Proof. In Appendix
2T = transpose. With a slight abuse in notation, we use yj ∈ y := (y1, . . . , yN ) to denote
a generic element of vector y.
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When everyone follows the strategy in Definition 1, the upper-triangular ma-
trix
Q :=

Q11 Q12 Q13 . . . Q1,N−1 Q1N
0 Q22 Q23 . . . Q2,N−1 Q2N
0 0 Q33 . . . Q3,N−1 Q3N
...
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 0 . . . QN−1,N−1 QN−1,N
0 0 0 . . . 0 1

describes how contagious punishment spreads from period to period, i.e., how
the economy transitions from a state with k to k′ defectors.
Decentralized punishment has five main properties. Punishment is irre-
versible (Property 1) and contagious (Property 2): If someone defects today,
then next period there can only be more defectors than today, and can never
be less. Clearly, the number of additional defectors depends on the monitoring
process.3 Punishment is decentralized (Property 3) and unforgiving (Property
4): Because defection is an absorbing state, the number of defectors expected
on any date is greater if we start with more defectors, and can only increase
over time. Finally, the number of defectors expected on any date is non-
3It follows that Qkk′ may or may not depend on the outcome of the random matching
process. For instance, consider private monitoring, Oi = {i, oi} for all i = 1, . . . , N . Here
the number of additional defectors depends only on the random matching process because
a cooperator j may switch to being a defector during t only by “direct contagion”, i.e., if
oj(t) is a defector; consequently, defectors can at most double from period to period, i.e., we
have Qkk′ = 0 for k′ > min(2k,N). Instead, the matching realization does not matter under
public monitoring, i.e., when Oi = {1, . . . , N} for all i = 1, . . . , N . The reader interested in
closed-form transition matrices for a = 0 can consult [5] or the Supporting Materials of this
paper, where we also study the case of a > 0 and of noise in transitions.
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decreasing in the number of actions that agents can observe in the economy
(Property 5).
We also define the probability ηkk′ that a defector, say, agent i, meets a
cooperator conditional on an outcome being realized that raises the number of
defectors from k to k′. Clearly, ηkk′ ≤ ηk−1,k′ for all k = 2, . . . , k′ with ηkk = 0;
this is due to random matching, which implies that meeting a cooperator today
is less likely when there are more defectors.
The unconditional probability that agent i meets a cooperator when there
are k defectors is:
σk =
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′ . (1)
A single defection eventually leads to 100% defections in the economy,
an absorbing state that is reached in finite time. To compute the expected
number of periods to full defection which is helpful in experimental contexts
(e.g., see [1]) define τk as the average number of periods required to have N
defectors in the economy when we start with k = 1, . . . , N defectors. We have
τk = 1 +
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′τk′ for k = 1, . . . , N − 1
τN = 0.
With probability Qkk the number of defectors does not further increase over
the course of one period; hence, the following period we expect once again τk
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periods before we have N defectors in the economy. With probability Qkk′
there are k′ − k new defectors by the end of the period, hence, tomorrow we
expect τk′ periods before we have N defectors in the economy. Clearly, τN = 0.
Let Q0 denote the matrix obtained when the last row of Q is a vector of
zeros. The elements of vector τ := (τ1, . . . , τN)T are solutions to the system of
equations
τ = 10 +Q0 · τ ⇒ (I −Q0) · τ = 10,
where I is the identity matrix and 10 is the N -dimensional unit vector whose
N th component is zero. Since I−Q0 is upper-triangular with non-zero diagonal
elements, then I−Q0 is invertible, and τ = (I−Q0)−1·10 is the unique solution.
4 Continuation payoffs: a recursive approach
Start by recognizing that the equilibrium payoff to any agent is
v0 =
piCC
1− β .
Now consider out-of-equilibrium situations in which there are k ≥ 1 defectors
at the start of a period and fix one defector, say, agent i.4 If decentralized
punishment is characterized by matrix Q as in Theorem 1, then using standard
4If k = 1 this corresponds to a situation in which one agent moves out of equilibrium.
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recursive methods the payoff to defector i is
vk =
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ [ηkk′piDC + (1− ηkk′)piDD + βvk′ ]. (2)
Using (1), letting v := (v1, . . . , vN)T and using eTkQv ≡
∑N
k′=kQkk′vk′ we have
vk = σkpiDC + (1− σk)piDD + βeTkQv.
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving the following result:
Theorem 2. Let there be k ≥ 1 defectors. The payoff to any defector satisfies
vk =
1
1− β [φkpiDC + (1− φk)piDD] (3)
where
φk := (1− β)eTk (I − βQ)−1σ,
with 0 = φN < φk+1 < φk < σk, lim
β→1−
φk = 0 and lim
β→1−
φk
1− β <∞. Moreover,
φk is non-increasing in a, φk − φk+1 is non-increasing in k and in a, and
φk − φk+1
1− β is non-decreasing in β.
The message is that the continuation payoff to a defector is a convex combina-
tion of the static payoff from meeting a cooperator and another defector. The
function φk is the rate at which a defector expects to meet cooperators in the
continuation game, as we will show in the remainder of this section.
To prove this result, let there be k ≥ 1 defectors at the start of a period;
fix one, say, agent i. Here σk is the probability that on this date defector i
meets a cooperator. Now consider future possible encounters between defector
i and cooperators. The probability that defector i meets a cooperator t ≥ 1
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periods from now depends on how many defectors there will be on that date.
To calculate this number, without loss in generality let t = 0 be the present
date (when we have k defectors). The probability to have k′ defectors on date
t = 1 is Qkk′ , on date t = 2 is Q2kk′ ≡
∑N
h=1QkhQhk′ , and it is Qtkk′ on date
t ≥ 1, i.e., it is cell (k, k′) of matrix Qt because Q is a transition matrix.
Consider period t = 0; ∑Nk′=1Qkk′σk′ is the probability that on t = 1
defector i will meet a cooperator. The probability that initial defector i meets
a cooperator t ≥ 0 periods from now is
N∑
k′=1
Qtkk′σk′ = eTkQtσ < 1.
To verify that eTkQtσ < 1 note that
∑N
k′=1Q
t
kk′ = 1 and σk′ < 1 for all k′ > 1.
Given that there are k ≥ 1 defectors at the start of a period, we now wish
to calculate the expected number of cooperators that any of these defectors
will meet in the continuation game (their future lifetime). To do so, suppose
for a moment that the economy is infinitely-lived, i.e., β = 1. Fix defector i
among the k current defectors. The expected number of cooperators that i
will meet in the continuation game is
eTkσ +
∞∑
t=1
eTkQ
tσ.
When β ∈ (0, 1), this number is calculated by adding the continuation proba-
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bility β, i.e., we have
σk + β
N∑
k′=1
Qkk′σk′ + β2
N∑
k′=1
Q2kk′σk′ + . . . = eTkσ +
∞∑
t=1
βteTkQ
tσ = eTk (I − βQ)−1σ.
Lemma 1. The sum eTkσ +
∑∞
t=1 β
teTkQ
tσ converges for all β ∈ [0, 1] and is
bounded above by (1− β)−1.
Proof. In Appendix
The expected number of cooperators that a defector meets in the contin-
uation game is finite (even if the horizon is infinite), because each current
cooperator can be met only once. This is due to the contagious punishment
process: when a defector meets a cooperator, the cooperator switches to de-
fection.5 Because cooperators may meet defectors in every period, the number
of cooperators is likely to fall over time, hence eventually no-one cooperates.
Now notice that if β < 1 and a defector meets one cooperator in each
period, then the number of cooperators met in the continuation game corre-
sponds exactly to the expected duration of the economy, which is (1− β)−1.6
We therefore normalize the expected number of cooperators that a defector
meets in the continuation game by the expected duration of the economy.
5Clearly, this expected number is bounded above by N − k because a defector cannot
meet more than N − k cooperators since each cooperator encountered becomes a defector.
This would still be true if defector-cooperator matches generated one new defector with
a probability less than one, i.e., if we added some noise to the decentralized punishment
process.
6Here (1 − β)βt is the probability that the economy lasts exactly t + 1 periods, so the
expected duration of the economy is (1− β)∑∞t=1 βt−1t = (1− β)−1.
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Given Q, σ, and β, this gives us a ratio that we call the contact rate:
φk = (1− β)eTk (I − βQ)−1σ for β ∈ (0, 1).
One can interpret this as the rate at which defector i expects to meet co-
operators in a period, in the continuation game, when there are currently
k ≥ 1 defectors. If there are few defectors, then agent i meets cooperators
at a high rate, and φk is close to one; otherwise, it is close to zero. Because
eTkσ +
∑∞
t=1 β
teTkQ
tσ is finite for all β, it is immediate that
lim
β→1−
φk = 0 and lim
β→1−
(1− β)−1φk <∞. (4)
In short, the contact rate reaches zero as the expected duration of the contin-
uation game approaches infinity because, in the long run, the economy will be
entirely populated by defectors.
Clearly, φN = 0 because matrix Q is upper-triangular and σN = 0; in-
tuitively, defection is an absorbing state, so once we have N defectors it is
impossible to meet cooperators in the continuation game. We have:
Lemma 2. For all k = 1, . . . , N − 1 we have (i) 0 = φN < φk+1 < φk < σk,
(ii) φk is non-increasing in a, (iii) φk − φk+1 is non-increasing in k and in a
(iv) φk − φk+11− β is non-decreasing in β.
Proof. In Appendix
To complete the proof of Theorem 2 note that since Q is upper triangular,
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matrix (I − βQ) is invertible, hence we use the definition of vk to obtain
v = σpiDC +(1−σ)piDD+βQv ⇒ v = (I−βQ)−1[σpiDC +(1−σ)piDD]
where vk ∈ v satisfies
vk = eTk (I − βQ)−1[σpiDC + (1− σ)piDD]
= 11− β [φkpiDC + (1− φk)piDD].
The defector’s payoff is a convex combination of two possible static payoffs:
the one from meeting a cooperator and the one from meeting a defector. The
contact rate φk serves as the convexification parameter. The virtue of this
approach is that it makes analysis of equilibrium quite tractable. We provide
an example of what we mean, next.
5 Cooperation with private monitoring
Here we demonstrate the tractability of our approach by revisiting the proof of
a well-known existence result for the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with
private monitoring studied in [4, 6]. Let the static payoffs to an agent i be:
piDD = d, piCD = d − l, piDC = d + g, and piCC = c, where g > 0, c > d,
l ≥ 0.7 There is private monitoring, so Oi(t) = {i, oi(t)} for all agents i in
each period t. That is, contagious punishment only spreads through direct
7The payoff formulation is a bit more general than in [4, 6], where the normalization
d = 0 is assumed. Note also that neither [6] nor [4] assume 2c > c + g + d − l, which—as
noted in [7]—is sometimes part of the definition of Prisoners’ Dilemma
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contagion. Conjecture that everyone follows the strategy in Definition 1.
The study in [6] proves that if l is sufficiently large, then there exists a
β∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β ∈ [β∗, 1) the outcome where k = 0 in each
period can be supported as a sequential equilibrium.
5.1 Existence of cooperative equilibrium
Start by recognizing that, from Theorem 2, the payoff to a defector when there
are k ≥ 1 defectors at the start of a generic period is
vk =
1
1− β [φk(c+ g) + (1− φk)d].
Consider one-shot deviations from the strategy in Definition 1. In equilibrium
an agent must choose C and not D. This holds if v0 − v1 ≥ 0, because v1
defines the payoff to someone who defects in equilibrium. From (3) we have
v0 − v1 = 11− β [c− d− φ1(c+ g − d)]. (5)
From Theorem 2 we have lim
β→1−
φ1
1− β <∞. By continuity there exists a value
β∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that v0 − v1 ≥ 0 for all β ∈ [β∗, 1).
Out of equilibrium, let agent i be one of k ≥ 2 defectors. Agent i chooses
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D (as specified in Definition 1), whenever
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ [ηkk′(c+ βvk′−1) + (1− ηkk′)(d− l + βvk′)]
≤ N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ [ηkk′(c+ g) + (1− ηkk′)d+ βvk′ ]
(6)
The right hand side is simply the payoff vk (recall that
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′ = σk).
The left-hand side reports the payoff to defector i when he does not punish:
he deviates by choosing C today, reverting to playing D forever, tomorrow. It
is derived using the recursive formulation of continuation payoffs in (2). With
probability Qkk′ the economy should transition to a state with k′ defectors, i.e.,
there are k′ − k mixed matches. The (conditional) probability that defector
i is in one of such mixed-matches is ηkk′ . Because defector i deviates only
today by choosing C instead of D, his current opponent does not become a
defector due to private monitoring the opponent only observes i’s action.
Hence, with probability Qkk′ηkk′ agent i’s continuation payoff is vk′−1 and not
vk′ . This adjustment does not apply if agent i is not in a mixed match (with
probability 1− ηkk′), as in this case his deviation C cannot reduce the number
of future defectors from k′ to k′ − 1.
Rewrite the above inequality as
β
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′(vk′−1 − vk′) ≤ σkg + (1− σk)l. (7)
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From equation (3) in Theorem 2, for all k ≥ 2 we have
vk−1 − vk = 11− β (φk−1 − φk)(c+ g − d) <∞ for all β ∈ (0, 1) (8)
because lim
β→1−
(1−β)−1φk <∞. Given any β ∈ (0, 1), deviating off equilibrium
is suboptimal if l is sufficiently large, and the existence proof is completed.
5.2 Characterization of bounds on parameters
The procedure developed in the previous sections has useful applications. It
allows us to find exact bounds for the parameters that sustain the contagious
equilibrium and to characterize them as functions of the model’s parameters.
Here, we characterize the lower bounds on β and l.
The discount factor
Here we derive the exact lower bound for β, such that deviating in equilibrium
is never optimal, and characterize it in terms of the cost of cooperation in
equilibrium. To do so, it is convenient to normalize the payoff parameter g
by c− d, which can be interpreted as the surplus from cooperation relative to
defection. The variable γ := g
c− d roughly speaking captures the (opportu-
nity) cost of cooperation in equilibrium, as it measures the gain from defecting
relative to the surplus from cooperating.
Proposition 1. In the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with private monitoring,
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the lower bound for β, such that deviating in equilibrium is never optimal is
β∗ := φ−11
( 1
1 + γ
)
,
a strictly increasing and concave function of γ.
Proof. In Appendix
FIG. 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE
Figures 1 illustrates the mapping between the bound β∗, the size of the
economy N , and the cost of cooperation in equilibrium γ. The minimal dis-
count factor that is necessary to support cooperation in equilibrium grows as
the opportunistic incentives increase, and as the economy grows larger.
The cost of slowing down contagion
Now we determine an exact lower bound for l, such that deviating out of
equilibrium is never optimal for a defector, for any belief on the number of
defectors k. We can think of l as the cost of cooperation off equilibrium.
Proposition 2. In the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with private monitoring,
if
l ≥ l(β, k) := 11− σk
{
(c+ g − d)
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′
β(φk′−1 − φk′)
1− β − σkg
}
,
then off equilibrium punishment is optimal under the belief that there are k =
2, . . . , N defectors. In particular, l(β, k) is non-decreasing in β, it is decreasing
in k and, if
l ≥ l∗ := (N − 2)(c− d),
19
then off-equilibrium punishment is optimal for any β ∈ (0, 1) and k.
Proof. In Appendix
Figures 2 helps us to understand how the cost of slowing down contagion
and the discount factor must co-vary to maintain the incentive to punish.
FIG. 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE
It plots the mapping between the minimum value of l, the beliefs about the
number of defectors off the equilibrium path of play, and the discount factor
β. The minimum value l needed to support punishment off equilibrium is
non-decreasing in β and non-increasing in k.
6 Extensions
This section explores two issues that emerge from the previous discussion. The
cost of cooperating off-equilibrium, i.e., the lower bound for the parameter
l, falls as k increases (Figure 2). This suggests that the possibility to see
actions outside of a match would strengthen the incentives to cooperate and
to punish because contagious punishment would spread more rapidly (Theorem
1, result 5). Proposition 2 has also made explicit the finding in [6] that as
economies get progressively large the incentives to carry out punishments can
be maintained only if the cost from cooperating off equilibrium grows large.
20
Adding public randomization devices, as in [4], may offer a way to resolve such
a shortcoming.8
6.1 Imperfect public monitoring
Here we provide counterparts for Propositions 1-2 under (imperfect) public
monitoring, which in this paper has been defined as a situation in which agents
observe the actions of a = 1, . . . , N − 2 anonymous agents outside of their
match, as discussed in Section 2.
The functional forms for off-equilibrium payoffs do not vary; the central
difference is that transition matrix and contact rate now depend on a. There-
fore, we write Q(a) and φk(a) for a > 0 and φk(0) ≡ φk and Q(0) ≡ Q.9 Now
each player expects that a individuals in addition to his opponent observe
his action in a period (see the proof of Theorem 1). Consequently, greater a
supports faster contagion, off-equilibrium, and a lower contact rate with coop-
erators. Naturally, this strengthens the incentive to cooperate, in equilibrium,
so the lower bound on the discount factor falls when actions can be observed
outside a match. Formally, we have a version of Proposition 1
Corollary 1 (Imperfect Public Monitoring and β). Consider the repeated Pris-
oners’ Dilemma with a = 1, . . . , N − 2. The lower bound for β, such that
deviating in equilibrium is suboptimal is
β(a) := φ−11 (a)
( 1
1 + γ
)
≤ β∗.
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting these extensions.
9An explicit expression for Q(a) is derived in the Supplementary Materials.
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Proof of Corollary 1. See Appendix
To study deviations off-equilibrium we must generalize expression (6) for
a > 0. Suppose agent i is one of k defectors, and deviates choosing C instead
of D. Such deviation is suboptimal if
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a){ηkk′(a)c+ (1− ηkk′(a))(d− l) + β
k′−k∑
j=0
αkk′(j; a)vk′−j}
≤
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)[ηkk′(a)(c+ g) + (1− ηkk′(a))d+ βvk′ ].
Given a and conditional on k′ − k new defectors, ηkk′(a) is the probability
that defector i meets a cooperator, while αkk′(j; a) is the probability that
j = 0, . . . , k′ − k cooperators see the action of i and of no other defector.10
Hence, if defector i plays C, then j cooperators do not switch to punishing.
The right-hand side is the payoff vk, as before. The left-hand side reports
the payoff to defector i when he cooperates, instead of punishing as he should.
Agent oi(t) may be a cooperator or not, which impacts i’s the period payoff (ei-
ther c or d− l). The continuation payoff depends on how many cooperators see
the action of no other defector but defector i. Since σk =
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)ηkk′(a),
for k ≤ k′ the inequality above yields
β
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)(vˆk′ − vk′) ≤ σkg + (1− σk)l,
10For a = 0 we have αkk′(1; 0) = ηkk′(0) ≡ ηkk′ , αkk′(0; 0) = 1− ηkk′ , and αkk′(j; 0) = 0
for all j = 2, . . . , k′ − k, and we get back (6).
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where the expectation vˆk′ :=
k′−k∑
j=0
αkk′(j; a)vk′−j is taken over the possible num-
ber of cooperators j who see the action of i (directly or indirectly) and of no
other defector. If i cooperates, these j agents keep cooperating, so we have
vk′−j. We obtain a version of Proposition 2.
Corollary 2 (Imperfect Public Monitoring and l). Consider the repeated Pris-
oners’ Dilemma with a = 1, . . . , N−2. Proposition 2 holds by replacing l(β, k)
with
l(β, k; a) := 11− σk
(c+ g − d)
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)
β(φˆk′(a)− φk′(a))
1− β − σkg
 ,
a non-increasing function of a, with φˆk′(a) :=
k′−k∑
j=0
αkk′(j; a)φk′−j(a).
Proof of Corollary 2. In Appendix.
A defector will not deviate (by cooperating) if l ≥ l(β, k; a), and since
l(β, k; a) is non-increasing in a, the cost of cooperation can be smaller when
players observe more actions in the economy. Intuitively, off-equilibrium a
defector is less capable to slow down contagion because cooperators are more
likely to observe defections somewhere else in the economy.
To sum up, if players can observe actions outside their match, then the
incentive to move off-equilibrium decreases since a deviation quickly generates
larger numbers of defectors compared to private monitoring. The incentive to
not punish also decreases because contagion spreads through indirect obser-
vation of defections. The message is that cooperative equilibrium is easier to
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sustain when players can observe some actions outside of their match.
6.2 Reverting to cooperation
Consider the case in which defection is not an absorbing state, following [4].
To simplify the discussion, assume private monitoring; the results go through
when this is not so. Suppose a public randomization device is available. At the
start of each date, the device randomly selects and makes public a number q˜t ∈
[0, 1] with uniform probability. Defectors switch state if q˜t is sufficiently high,
say, higher than q ∈ (0, 1); everyone else remains in their state. Consequently,
the strategy in Definition 1 is modified as follows:11 at the start of a period t,
a cooperator who observes a defection starts punishing in t+1 only if q˜t+1 < q;
a defector reverts back to cooperation in t+ 1 only if q˜t+1 ≥ q. In sum, out of
equilibrium, the economy can revert back to full cooperation, with probability
1 − q. We show that in this case the incentives to cooperate (in equilibrium)
decrease, while the incentives to punish (off-equilibrium) increase.
The continuation payoff in equilibrium is still v0. Suppose that off-equilibrium
there are k ≥ 1 defectors at the start of some period, and fix one, say, agent
i. Since decentralized punishment is still characterized by matrix Q, the off-
11See Supplementary Materials for formal definitions and details of this section’s analysis.
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equilibrium payoff to agent i for k = 1, . . . , N is
wk =
1
1− βq [φk(βq)piDC + (1− φk(βq))piDD + β(1− q)v0],
where φk(βq) = (1 − βq)eTk (I − βqQ)−1σ, to emphasize the difference with
φk ≡ φk(β) (no random device). As q → 1, we have wk → vk for all k ≥ 1.
In equilibrium a generic agent must choose C and not D, which holds if
v0 − w1 = 11− βq [c− d− φ1(βq)(c+ g − d)] ≥ 0.
There exists a value qβ = β∗ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying c − d = φ1(βq)(c + g − d)
(Proposition 1). Hence, v0 − w1 ≥ 0 for all qβ ∈ [β∗, 1); defecting is subop-
timal in equilibrium for all β ∈
[
β∗
q
, 1
)
. Therefore, the availability of public
randomization devices makes it harder to sustain cooperation in equilibrium.
Intuitively, the possibility to revert to cooperation after a defection is akin to
introducing the possibility of renegotiation, which raises off-equilibrium pay-
offs, hence strengthens the incentive to defect.
Off-equilibrium, punishment is incentive-compatible if
qβ
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′(wk′−1 − wk′) ≤ σkg + (1− σk)l.
which is simply expression (7) with the adjustment for the randomization q.
So, cooperating off-equilibrium is suboptimal for any β and l, if q is sufficiently
small; and it is suboptimal for any β and q, when l is sufficiently large.
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The inequality above holds for l ≥ l(qβ, k), defined in Proposition 2. Since
l(x, k) is a non-decreasing function of x ∈ (0, 1) (Proposition 2), l(qβ, k) ≤
l(β, k) for all q ∈ (0, 1], and for all k ≥ 1. With a public randomization device,
punishment is more easily sustained off the equilibrium path, even if the cost
from cooperating is small, and even if the population is large.
7 Final remarks
We have studied contagious equilibrium in infinitely repeated games where
players are randomly matched in pairs, in each period, to play a game. The
methodological innovation is to identify a key statistic of contagious punish-
ment that, together with a recursive formulation, generates tractable closed-
form expressions for continuation payoffs, out of equilibrium. A virtue of this
approach is that it makes the analysis of contagious equilibrium transparent,
allows us to generalize the expressions for continuation payoffs for all beliefs
about the number of defectors, and gives us a way to characterize exact bounds
on the parameters that are key to ensuring that cooperation is self-enforcing.
An application of the analysis developed in this study for something other
than a Prisoners’ Dilemma game is found in [3], which studies sequential equi-
librium with and without monetary exchange in random matching economies
in which agents play a helping game, repeatedly.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The existence of the transition matrix Q immediately
follows from the indefinite repetition of a game in which everyone adopts the
strategy in Definition 1. In particular, notice that ∑Nk′=1Qkk′ = 1 for all
k = 1, . . . , N . The properties of Q are derived from the features of the strategy
in Definition 1.
Property 1: It directly follows from the random matching assumption. For
1 ≤ k < N , there is a positive probability that some cooperator meets a
defector; hence, there is a positive probability that some cooperator switches
to playing D forever.
Property 2: It hinges on the fact that defection is an absorbing state for an
agent.
Property 3: Let κ := (1, . . . , N)T be the vector of all possible defectors in
the economy. Let there be k ≥ 1 defectors at the start of some date. The
average number of defectors in the economy after t ≥ 1 periods is
µk(t) = eTkQtκ =
N∑
k′=1
Qtkk′k
′ =
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′k
′ ≥ k,
We have
µk(t+ 1)− µk(t) = eTkQt(Q− I)κ ≥ 0
because each element of vector (Q − I)κ is non-negative. This is so because
each row j of vector Qκ gives us µj(1), while each row j of vector Iκ gives us
j, and we know from the previous result that µj(1) ≥ j. Intuitively, defection
is an absorbing state, so, if we have k defectors, then the expected number of
defectors can only increase over time above the initial number k.
Property 4: Consider two economies differentiated according to their initial
number of defectors, k and k + 1. Let agent h be starting as a cooperator in
the k−economy and as a defector in the (k + 1)−economy. Recall that the
matching process is independent of k.
Let C(t) be the set of cooperators at date t when the economy starts with k
defectors. We have
|C(0)| = N − k and C(t+ 1) ⊆ C(t)
Consider h ∈ C(0), and denote by Dh(t) the set of new defectors generated by
making h a initial defector, instead of a cooperator. Clearly Dh(0) = {h} and,
by properties 1 and 2, we have that |Dh(t)| > 1 with positive probability in all
t ≥ 1. Now let E|Dh(t)| denote the expected number of additional defectors
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that exist on date t as a consequence of agent h being an initial defector in
the (k + 1)−economy. We have
µk+1(t)− µk(t) = E|Dh(t)|
because µk(t) is the expected cardinality of the set of defectors present on date
t, given k initial defectors.
Property 5: Consider two economies differentiated according to the param-
eter a = 0, . . . , N − 2, i.e., the number of agents outside of a player’s match,
whose actions are observed in a period. These a agents are randomly selected
with a uniform probability, iid across agents. Denote by Qkk′(a) the elements
of the transition probability, to make explicit their dependence from the num-
ber a of observations made outside of a match. Let there be k ≥ 1 defectors
at the start of some date. The expected number of defectors in the economy
after t ≥ 1 periods is
µk(t; a) = eTkQt(a)κ =
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′(a)k′,
We want to prove
µk(t; a+ 1) ≥ µk(t; a), for all a.
Suppose agent i defects on some date. The deviation is observed by the
opponent oi on that date (direct contagion) and possibly by r = 0, 1, . . . , N−2
agents outside of the match {i, oi} (indirect contagion). A generic agent h /∈
{i, oi} observes the action of i with probability p(a) = a
N − 2, i.e., i ∈ Oh
with probability p(a) in that period. This probability neither depends on the
identity of h nor on the period. Hence, in each period the probability P (r; a)
that r = 0, . . . , N − 2 agents who have not met agent i observe his action is
P (r; a) =
(
N − 2
r
)
p(a)r(1− p(a))N−2−r.
Hence, we expect that oi and
N−2∑
r=0
P (r; a)r = a others observe the defection of
i; so, the expected number of defectors µk(t; a) is non-decreasing in a.
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Proof of Lemma 1. When β ∈ [0, 1) we have
eTkσ +
∞∑
t=1
βteTkQ
tσ < eTk1 +
∞∑
t=1
βteTkQ
t1 = (1− β)−1.
where 1 is an N×1 unit vector. The inequality follows from Theorem 1, which
proves that eTkQt1 = 1 for all t because Qt is a transition matrix.
When β = 1, recall that σN = 0 and Q is upper-triangular. Hence we can
write ∞∑
t=0
eTkQ
tσ = eTk
∞∑
t=0
Qt0σ = eTk (I −Q0)−1σ <∞,
where Q0 is matrix Q where row N is all zeros. Clearly,
∑∞
t=0Q
t
0 converges
since all diagonal elements in Q0 are less than one (Theorem 1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let k = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Proving φk ≤ σk: Recall that Qtkk′ = 0 for k′ < k and σk > σk′ for k′ > k.
Hence,
eTk (I − βQ)−1σ = σk +
∞∑
t=1
βt
N∑
k′=1
Qtkk′σk′ = σk +
∞∑
t=1
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′σk′
< σk + σk
∞∑
t=1
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′ = σk + σkβ(1− β)−1
= σk(1− β)−1.
Proving φk > φk+1: We need
φk = (1− β)−1σk + (1− β)−1
∞∑
t=1
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′σk′
> (1− β)−1σk+1 + (1− β)−1
∞∑
t=1
βt
N∑
k′=k+1
Qtk+1,k′σk′ = φk+1,
which always holds if
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′σk′ ≥
N∑
k′=k+1
Qtk+1,k′σk′ , because σk > σk+1. Note
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that
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′σk′ =
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′
N − k′
N − 1 =
N
N − 1 −
1
N − 1
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′k
′
≥ N
N − 1 −
1
N − 1
N∑
k′=k+1
Qtk+1,k′k
′ =
N∑
k′=k+1
Qtk+1,k′
N − k′
N − 1
=
N∑
k′=k+1
Qtk+1,k′σk′
since µk+1(t) =
∑N
k′=k+1Q
t
k+1,k′k
′ ≥ µk(t) = ∑Nk′=kQtkk′k′ by Theorem 1.
Proving φk is non-increasing in a: We make explicit the dependence of
matrix Q from a, using the notation Q(a). We wish to prove that for each
k = 1, . . . , N and for each a = 0, 1, . . . , N − 2
φk(a+ 1) ≤ φk(a). (9)
Recall that
φk(a) = (1− β)eTk (I − βQ(a))−1σ,
where
eTk (I − βQ(a))−1σ = σk + β
N∑
k′=1
Qkk′(a)σk′ + β2
N∑
k′=1
Q2kk′(a)σk′ + . . .
So, it is sufficient to show that
β
N∑
k′=1
Qkk′(a+ 1)σk′ + β2
N∑
k′=1
Q2kk′(a+ 1)σk′ + . . .
≤ β
N∑
k′=1
Qkk′(a)σk′ + β2
N∑
k′=1
Q2kk′(a)σk′ + . . .
We exploit Property 5 of Theorem 1, using the notation
µk(t; a) := eTkQt(a)κ =
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′(a)k′.
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For each t = 1, 2, . . .
N∑
k′=1
Qtkk′(a+ 1)σk′ =
N∑
k′=1
Qtkk′(a+ 1)
N − k′
N − 1
= N
N − 1 −
1
N − 1
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′(a+ 1)k′
≤ N
N − 1 −
1
N − 1
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′(a)k′ =
N∑
k′=1
Qtkk′(a)σk′ .
Proving that φk−φk+1 is non-increasing in k: Consider an economy with
k = 1, . . . , N − 1 initial defectors, and fix one of them, say, agent i. Let 0
denote the initial date and let C(t) denote the set of cooperators at the start
of period t ≥ 0 when we have fixed k initial defectors. Clearly i /∈ C(0) and,
since defection is an absorbing state, we have C(t+ 1) ⊆ C(t) for all t.
Now, suppose that we start with k + 1 initial defectors; to do so, we move
one cooperator, called agent h 6= i, from C(0) to the complementary set of k
initial defectors CC(0). We wish to track the set of additional defectors Dh(t)
that exist in period t, as a (direct or indirect) consequence of making agent
h an initial defector, instead of an initial cooperator. This can be found by
recursively defining the set of cooperators who, on some date t, have switched
to defection only as the result of seeing the actions of h or of any defectors
created as a result of h’s initial defection.
We have
Dh(0) = {h}
Dh(t) =
{
j ∈
(
CC(t) ∩ C(t− 1)
)
∪ Dh(t− 1)|
Oj(t− 1) ⊆
(
C(t− 1) unionsq Dh(t− 1)
)}
The element j ∈ CC(t) ∩ C(t − 1) captures the requirement that agent j can
be a new defector: he cooperates in t− 1 and starts to defect in t. But agent
j can also be an old defector, infected by agent h, i.e., j ∈ Dh(t − 1). The
component Oj(t−1) ⊆
(
C(t−1)unionsqDh(t−1)
)
captures the requirement that if
j observes defections, then these defections must come from agents “infected”
by agent h. This means that, if j was a cooperator in t − 1, then j starts to
defect in t exclusively as a consequence of seeing the action of some defector
in Dh(t − 1). Instead, if j ∈ Dh(t − 1), then j should not meet a defector
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outside of Dh(t− 1) in period t− 1; i.e., agent j would remain a cooperator in
t if agent h did not start to defect in period 0. Clearly Dh(t) depends on the
number of defectors k′ at the start of date t, because |CC(t)| = k′.
Using the definition of φk we have
φk − φk+1 = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′ Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t)|k′].
Recall that φk+11− β is the expected number of cooperators that a defector en-
counters (over his lifetime), when the economy starts with k + 1 defectors,
one of which is agent h. If agent h were not a defector in period 0, then the
agents in Dh(t, a) would be cooperators in t. Therefore, φk − φk+11− β is the ex-
pected number of additional cooperators that a defector encounters (over his
lifetime), if agent h were a cooperator instead of being a defector on date 0
(i.e., if we started with k instead of k+1 defectors). So, suppose agents i and h
are defectors on the initial date 0. Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t)|k′] is the probability that,
t periods forward, agent i meets either h or any of the cooperators “infected”
by h. Clearly, this probability is conditional on the number of additional de-
fectors k′ − k added over the course of t periods, since Dh(t) is contained in
the set of all defectors added over the periods 1, . . . , t.
Now, fix another agent l 6= h and define the set G(t) = Dh(t) ∪ Dl(t) We
have
φk − φk+2 = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′ Pr[oi(t) ∈ G(t)|k′]
where
Pr[oi(t) ∈ G(t)|k′] = Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t)|k′] + Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dl(t)|k′]
−Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t) ∩ Dl(t)|k′]
Since the random matching process is independent of agent’s identities, we
have
Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t)|k′] = Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dl(t)|k′]
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Hence,
φk+1 − φk+2 = (φk − φk+2)− (φk − φk+1)
= (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′ Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t)|k′]
−(1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′ Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t) ∩ Dl(t)|k′]
≤ φk − φk+1
Proving that φk − φk+1 is non-increasing in a: Again, we make explicit
the dependence of matrix Q from a, using the notation Q(a).
We wish to show that
φk − φk+1 = (1− β)
∞∑
t=0
βt
N∑
k′=k
Qtkk′(a) Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t, a)|k′]}
is non-increasing in a for all k and all a. Here, set Dh(t, a) comprises all agents
who become defectors in some period 0, . . . , t only as a consequence of agent
h being one of k + 1 initial defectors and that a observations can be made
outside a match.
Defining dt(a; k′ − k) := |Dh(t, a)| when there are k′ defectors on date t
and k defectors on date 0, we have Pr
(
oi(t) ∈ Dh(t, a)|k′
)
= dt(a; k
′ − k)
N − 1 . In
what follows we omit the argument k′ − k when understood.
To prove that φk − φk+1 is non-increasing in a, we proceed by induction.
Fix a, and fix a set of k defectors in period 0, and the number of defectors in
period t ≥ 1, i.e., k′. Now fix a trajectory of matching and of observations,
that takes us from k defectors in period 0 to k′ defectors in period t, given
the observations a that can be done outside of a match. Use the definition of
Dh(t, a) in the proof of Lemma 2, where a is made explicit.
For the initial step, we prove that if t = 1, then d1(a) ≥ d1(a + 1). Recall
that Dh(0, a) = Dh(0, a + 1) = Dh(0) = {h} and C(0, a) = C(0, a + 1) = C(0)
by assumption since the set of k initial defectors (hence of initial cooperators)
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is fixed. Consequently,
d1(a) =
∣∣∣∣{j ∈ (CC(1, a) ∩ C(0)) unionsq Dh(0)| Oj(0, a) ⊆ (C(0) unionsq Dh(0))}∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣{j ∈ (CC(1, a+ 1) ∩ C(0)) unionsq Dh(0)|
Oj(0, a+ 1) ⊆
(
C(0) unionsq Dh(0)
)}∣∣∣∣ = d1(a+ 1)
because we have |CC(1, a)| = |CC(1, a+ 1)| = k′ and Oj(0, a) ⊆ Oj(0, a+ 1).
For the induction step, assume dt−1(a) ≥ dt−1(a + 1) for some t > 2. We
want to prove that dt(a) ≥ dt(a+1). Recall that |CC(t, a)| = |CC(t, a+1)| = k′
by assumption. We have
dt(a) =
∣∣∣∣{j ∈ (CC(t, a) ∩ C(t− 1, a)) unionsq Dh(t− 1, a)|
Oj(t− 1, a) ⊆
(
C(t− 1, a) unionsq Dh(t− 1, a)
)}∣∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣∣{j ∈ (CC(t, a+ 1) ∩ C(t− 1, a+ 1)) unionsq Dh(t− 1, a+ 1)|
Oj(t− 1, a+ 1) ⊆
(
C(t− 1, a+ 1) unionsq Dh(t− 1, a+ 1)
)}∣∣∣∣
= dt(a+ 1)
because
• dt−1(a) ≡ |Dh(t−1, a)| ≥ |Dh(t−1, a+1)| ≡ dt−1(a+1) by the induction
hypothesis.
• |C(t−1, a+1)| ≤ |C(t−1, a)|, by the properties of the contagious process
reported in Theorem 1 (the number of defectors cannot be lower if agents
can make more observations).
• Oj(t− 1, a) ⊆ Oj(t− 1, a+ 1)
Hence, given an initial set of k defectors, and given a number of defectors
|CC(t, a)| = |CC(t, a′)| = k′ in period t for some a′ > a, the size of Dh(t, a) is
non-increasing in a for all t. Noticing that Pr[oi(t) ∈ Dh(t, a)|k′] = dt(a)
N − 1 we
conclude that φk − φk+1 is non-increasing in a.
Finally, it is immediate that φk − φk+11− β is non-decreasing in β.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Using (7) and the definition of γ observe that β∗
is a solution to the implicit function
φ1 − 11 + γ = 0
where φ1 is a function of β as indicated in Theorem 2. We will prove that φ1 is
a strictly monotone, decreasing function of β and, consequently, the function
φ1 is invertible so
β∗ := φ−11
( 1
1 + γ
)
,
in which case
∂β∗
∂γ
= − 1
φ′1
1
(1 + γ)2
∣∣∣∣
β=β∗
> 0,
∂2β∗
∂γ2
= 1
φ′1
 2
(1 + γ)3 − φ
′′
1
(
1
φ′1(1 + γ)2
)2 ∣∣∣∣
β=β∗
< 0.
To prove that φk is a decreasing function of β for all k = 1, . . . , N − 1, use the
expression for φk. We have
φ′k :=
∂φk
∂β
= −eTk (I − βQ)−1[I − (1− β)Q(I − βQ)−1]σ < 0.
φ′′k :=
∂2φk
∂β2
= −2eTk (I − βQ)−1Q(I − βQ)−1[I − (1− β)Q(I − βQ)−1]σ < 0.
The negative sign of the derivatives follow from noting (from Lemma 1) that
the vector (I − βQ)−1σ < (1 − β)−11, where 1 is an N × 1 unit vector.
Since Q is a transition matrix, then Q(I − βQ)−1σ < Q(1 − β)−11 and so
[I − (1 − β)Q(I − βQ)−1]σ ≥ 0 is a non-zero vector because 0 = σN < σk′ <
σk < σ1 ≤ 1 by definition of σk.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (8), inequality (7) is rearranged as
β
1− β
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′(c+ g − d)(φk′−1 − φk′) ≤ σkg + (1− σk)l,
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which holds if
l ≥ l(β, k) := 11− σk
{
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′
[
(c+ g − d)× β(φk′−1 − φk′)1− β − g
]}
.
where we have used that σk =
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′ .
We know that φk
′−1 − φk′
1− β is non-decreasing in β (Theorem 2). Therefore
l(β, k) is non-decreasing in β.
Now we argue that l(β, k) is decreasing in k. To see this, notice that
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′ak′ = σk when ak′ = 1 for all k′ ≥ k. Hence,
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′ak′ is
decreasing in k when ak′ = 1 for all k′ ≥ k, and therefore also when ak′ is a
decreasing sequence. Clearly,
ak′ =
(c+ g − d)β(φk′−1 − φk′)
1− β − g
is a decreasing sequence because φk
′−1 − φk′
1− β is decreasing in k
′ (Theorem 2) .
Consequently, l(β, k) > l(β, k + 1) for all k = 2, . . . , N .
We can find an upper bound for l(β, k) by noticing, from Theorem 2, that
β
1− β (φk−1 − φk) ≤
β
1− β (φ1 − φ2) <∞ for each k = 2, . . . , N .
To find β1− β (φ1 − φ2) use the recursive equation v1 = c + g + βv2, which
substituting v1 and v2 from (3) is written as
1
1− β [φ1(c+ g) + (1− φ1)d] = c+ g +
β
1− β [φ2(c+ g) + (1− φ2)d],
or, equivalently,
β
1− β (φ1 − φ2) = 1− φ1. (10)
Since β1− β (φk−1 − φk) is non-decreasing in β (Theorem 2), we have
sup
β∈(0,1)
β
1− β (φ1 − φ2) = limβ→1−
β
1− β (φ1 − φ2) = 1− limβ→1− φ1 = 1, (11)
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where we used (10) to get the second equality and the last equality follows
from lim
β→1−
φk = 0 for all k ≥ 1 (Theorem 2). From (11) we have
l(β, k) ≤ 11− σk
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′ηkk′ [(c+ g − d)× 1− g]
= σk1− σk (c− d) =
N − k
k − 1 (c− d)
≤ l∗ := (N − 2)(c− d).
Hence l ≥ l∗ is sufficient for the optimality of off equilibrium punishment.
Proof of Corollary 1. As before, deviating in equilibrium is suboptimal if
v0− v1 ≥ 0. Following the same procedure used in the earlier proof, using (7),
we have
v0 − v1 = 11− β [c− d− φ1(a)(c+ g − d)] = 0
for a value β(a) ∈ (0, 1). Recall that, when a = 0, β∗ ≡ β(0) satisfies v0−v1 =
0. Since φ1(a) ≤ φ1(0) (Lemma 2) and φk(a) is decreasing in β for every a, we
have that β(a) ≤ β∗.
Proof of Corollary 2. By Theorem 2 lim
β→1−
(1 − β)−1φk(a) < ∞ for all k.
Hence, deviating off-equilibrium is suboptimal when l is sufficiently large.
We now characterize l(β, k; a), starting by proving that it is non-decreasing
in β. Note that
φˆk′(a)− φk′(a)
1− β ≡
1
1− β
k′−k∑
j=0
αkk′(j; a)[φk′−j(a)− φk′(a)].
We also have the telescoping sum (omitting a when understood)
φk′−j − φk′
1− β =
φk′−j − φk′−j+1
1− β +
φk′−j+1 − φk′−j+2
1− β + . . .+
φk′−1 − φk′
1− β ,
whose terms of the right-hand side are non-negative and non-decreasing in β
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(Theorem 2). It follows that
β(φˆk′(a)− φk′(a))
1− β
is non-decreasing in β. Consequently, l(β, k; a) is non-decreasing in β.
To prove that l(β, k) is decreasing in k, rewrite it as
l(β, k; a) = 11− σk
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)ηkk′(a)
(c+ g − d)β(φˆk′(a)− φk′(a))1− β − g

+ 11− σk
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)(1− ηkk′(a))(c+ g − d)β(φˆk′(a)− φk′(a))1− β
Using the telescoping sum above, it follows that the first term is decreasing in
k. The second term, instead, can be rewritten as
(c+ g − d) β1− β
∑N
k′=kQkk′(a)(1− ηkk′(a))(φˆk′(a)− φk′(a))∑N
k′=kQkk′(a)(1− ηkk′(a))
where we have exploited the fact that
1− σk =
N∑
k′=k
Qkk′(a)(1− ηkk′).
Since φˆk′(a) − φk′(a) is decreasing in k′ ≥ k, it follows that the second term
of the expression above is also decreasing in k. Consequently, l(β, k; a) is
decreasing in k.
To prove that l(β, k) is non-increasing in a it is sufficient to show that
φˆk′(a)− φk′(a)
is decreasing in a. Given that φˆk′(a) =
k′−k∑
j=0
αkk′(j; a)φk′−j(a), this follows from
φk(a)−φk+1(a) being non increasing in a (Lemma 2). Hence, the cooperation
cost l(β, k; a) is non-increasing in the public monitoring parameter a.
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Figure 1: The lower bound for β
Notes: The figure plots the function β∗ for N = 4, 20, 40 as γ varies from 0 to 5 by fixing
(c, d) = (1, 0) and varying g from 0 to 5
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Figure 2: The lower bound for l
Notes: The figure plots the function max(0, l(β, k)) for N = 20, k = 2, 4, 6, and β ∈ (β∗, 1).
We have fixed (c, d, g) = (1, 0, 0.1), hence β∗ = 0.48
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